

Certification Practice Statement (CPS) –  
Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd

(Version 4.1.0)

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Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd  
25-C Jhotwara Industrial Area  
Jaipur-302012

Certifying Authority

**CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT**

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## DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are to be used while reading this CPS. Unless otherwise specified, the word "CA" used throughout this document refers to Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA, likewise, CPS means CPS of Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA. Words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000 and subsequent amendments, hereafter referred to as the ACT have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the Act.

The following terms bear the meanings assigned to them hereunder and such definitions apply to both the singular and plural forms of such terms:

**"Act"** means Information Technology IT Act, 2000

**"ITAct"** Information Technology IT Act, 2000, its amendments, Rules thereunder, Regulations, and Guidelines Issued by CCA

**"ASP"** or "Application Service Provider" is an organization or an entity using Electronic Signature as part of their application to facilitate the user for requesting issuance and electronically signing the content through any empanelled ESP.

**"Auditor"** means any accredited computer security professional or agency recognized and engaged by CCA for conducting an audit of the operation of CA;

**"CA"** refers to Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA, a Certifying Authority, licensed by the Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA), Govt. of India under provisions of the IT Act, and includes CA Infrastructure issuing Digital Signature Certificates & also for providing Trust services such as E-SIGN, TS, OSCP & CRL

**"CA Infrastructure"** The architecture, organization, techniques, practices, and procedures that collectively support the implementation and operation of the CA. It includes a set of policies, processes, server platforms, software, and workstations, used to administer Digital Signature Certificates and keys.

**"CA Verification Officer"** means a trusted person involved in identity and address verification of DSC applicants and according to approval for issuance of DSC.

**"Certification Practice Statement or CPS"** means a statement issued by a CA and approved by CCA to specify the practices that the CA employs in issuing Digital Signature Certificates;

**"Certificate"**—A Digital Signature Certificate issued by CA.

**"Certificate Issuance"**—The actions performed by a CA in creating a Digital Signature Certificate and notifying the Digital Signature Certificate applicant (anticipated to become a Subscriber) listed in the Digital Signature Certificate of its contents.

**“Certificate Policy”**—The India PKI Certificate Policy laid down by CCA and followed by CA addresses all aspects associated with the CA’s generation, production, distribution, accounting, compromise recovery, and administration of Digital Signature Certificates.

**Certificate Revocation List (CRL)**—A periodically (or exigently) issued list, digitally signed by a Certifying Authority, of identified Digital Signature Certificates that have been suspended or revoked before their expiration dates.

**“Controller”** or **“CCA”** means the Controller of Certifying Authorities appointed as per Section 17 subsection (1) of the Act.

**Crypto Token/Smart Card**—a hardware cryptographic device used for generating and storing a user’s private key(s) and containing a public key certificate, and, optionally, a cache of other certificates, including all certificates in the user's certification chain.

**"Digital Signature"** means authentication of any electronic record by a Subscriber using an electronic method or procedure following the provisions of section 3 of the IT Act;

**“Digital Signature Certificate Applicant”** or **“DSC Applicant”** —A person that requests the issuance of a Digital Signature Certificate by a Certifying Authority.

**“Digital Signature Certificate Application”** or **“DSC Application”** —A request from a Digital Signature Certificate applicant to a CA for the issuance of a Digital Signature Certificate

**Digital Signature Certificate**—This means a Digital Signature Certificate issued under subsection (4) of section 35 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

**“ESP”** or **“eSign Service Provider”** is a Trusted Third Party as per the definition in the Second Schedule of the Information Technology Act to provide eSign service. ESP is operated within CA Infrastructure & empanelled by CCA to provide Online Electronic Signature Service.

**Organization**—an entity with which a user is affiliated. An organization may also be a user.

**“Private Key”** means the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature;

**"Public Key"** means the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature and listed in the Digital Signature Certificate;

**“Relying Party”** is a recipient who acts in reliance on a certificate and digital signature.

**“Relying Party Agreement”** Terms and conditions published by CA for the acceptance of the certificate issued or facilitated the digital signature creation.

**"Subscriber Identity Verification method"** means the method used for the verification of the information (submitted by the Subscriber) that is required to be included in the Digital Signature Certificate issued to the Subscriber in compliance with CPS. CA follows the Identity Verification Guidelines laid down by the Controller.

**Subscriber**— a person in whose name the Digital Signature Certificate is issued by CA.

**Time Stamping Service:** A service provided by CA to its Subscribers to indicate the correct date and time of action and the identity of the person or device that sent or received the time stamp.

**Subscriber Agreement**— the agreement executed between a Subscriber and for the provision of designated public certification services under this Certification Practice Statement

**Time Stamp**—a notation that indicates (at least) the correct date and time of an action, and the identity of the person or device that sent or received the time stamp.

"**Trusted Person**" means any person who has:

- I. Direct responsibilities for the day-to-day operations, security, and performance of those business activities that are regulated under the Act or Rules in respect of a CA, or
- II. Duties directly involving the issuance, renewal, suspension, revocation of Digital Signature Certificates (including the identification of any person requesting a Digital Signature Certificate from a licensed Certifying Authority), creation of private keys, or administration of CA's computing facilities.

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## 1. Introduction

Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd is a Non-Govt. company registered at Registrar of Companies. Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd is the created for its CA business. This CPS addresses the technical, procedural personnel policies and practices of the CA in all services and during the complete life cycle of certificates as issued by Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA, operated and owned by Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd.

The term “Certifying Authority” or CA as used in this CPS, refers to Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA. as the entity that holds the CA license from the Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA), Govt. of India.

India PKI is a hierarchical PKI with the trust chain starting from the Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI). RCAI is operated by the Office of Controller of Certifying Authorities, Government of India. Below RCAI there are Certifying Authorities (CAs) licensed by CCA to issue Digital Signature Certificates under the provisions of IT Act. These are also called Licensed CAs. Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA is a Licensed CA under RCAI.

### 1.1. Overview of CPS

India PKI CP defines certificate policies to facilitate interoperability among Subscribers and Relying Parties for e-commerce and e-governance in India. The CP and Certifying Authorities (CAs) are governed by the Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA). Certificates issued by CAs contain one or more registered Certificate Policy OID, which may be used by a Relying Party to decide whether a certificate can be trusted for a particular purpose.

The Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of Speed Sign Technologies Pvt LTD CA details the practices and operational procedures implemented to meet the assurance requirements. This CPS is consistent with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF PKIX) RFC 3647, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Framework. The controller of the Certifying Authority issues a licence to operate as a Certifying Authority subject to a successful compliance audit of the CA per the CPS. The CPS is also

- (i) intended to apply to and is a legally binding document between the CA, the Subscribers, the applicants, the Relying Parties, employees, and contractors; and
- (ii) intended to serve as notice to all parties within the context of the CA CPS

CPS refers to the various requirements specified under the following guidelines issued by CCA

- (i) The identity Verification Guidelines [CCA-IVG]: For the identity verification for different types of certificates like a personal, organizational person, SSL, encryption, code signing, system certificate, etc.
- (ii) Interoperability Guidelines for DSC [CCA-IOG]: For the certificate profile including content and format of the certificates, key usage, extended key usage, etc
- (iii) X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI [CCA-CP]: Assurance Class, Certificate policy ID, the validity of certificates, key size, algorithm, storage requirements, audit parameters, etc

- (iv) Guidelines for Issuance of SSL Certificates [CCA-SSL]: Additional requirements for the issuance of SSL certificates
- (v) e-Authentication guidelines [CCA-AUTH]: The security procedures for key generation, keyprotectionand audit logs, signature format, identity verification requirements, etc.
- (vi) Security Requirements for Crypto Devices [CCA-CRYPTO]: The crypto device management & security requirements for holding Subscribers' private key
- (vii) CA Site Specification [CCA-CASITESP]: Requirements for the construction of the cryptographic site andsecurity requirements

## 1.2 Identification

The contact details are mentioned in section 1.5.2 of this CPS.

The following are the levels of assurance defined in the Certificate Policy.Each level of assurance has an OID that can be asserted in certificates issued byCA if the certificate issuance meets the requirements for that assurance level.The OIDs registered under the CCA are as follows:

Assurance Level	OID
Class 1	2.16.356.100.2.1
Class 2	2.16.356.100.2.2
Class 3	2.16.356.100.2.3
eKYC - Single-Factor	2.16.356.100.2.4.1
eKYC - Multi-Factor	2.16.356.100.2.4.2

The OIDs allocated to CA and CPS areas are given below

Serial No.	Product	OID
1	Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA	2.16.356.100.1.29
2	Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA CPS	2.16.356.100.1.29.2

OID for document signer certificates

Document signer	2.16.356.100.10.1
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## 1.3. PKI Participants

### 1.3.1. PKI Authorities

#### 1.3.1.1. Controller of Certifying Authorities (CCA)

In the context of the CPS, the CCA is responsible for:

1. Developing and administering India PKI CP.
2. Compliance analysis and approval of the licensed CAs CPS;
3. Laying down guidelines for Identity Verification, Interoperability of DSCs, and Private Key storage
4. Ensuring continued conformance of Licensed CAs with the CPS by examining compliance audit results.

### 1.3.1.2. CA

The Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA is licensed by the CCA as per the Information Technology Act. The primary function of CA is to issue end-entity certificates.

Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA certificates are certified by the Root Certifying Authority of India (RCAI). In India's PKI hierarchy, the Root certificate is the trust anchor for CA certificates. The following are the CA Certificates issued to CA.

SI No	CA Certificate	Certified by
2	Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA 2022	CCA India 2022

CA created Sub-CAs to issue Digital Signature Certificates. CA certifies Sub-CA certificates and these Sub-CAs issue end entity certificates. Sub-CA suspends or revokes the end-entity Digital Signature Certificates. The CA maintains the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) CA for the revoked and suspended Digital Signature Certificates in its repository. CRL is signed by the issuing CA.

### 1.3.1.3. Sub-CA

Sub-CAs are created and maintained in CA Physical infrastructure to meet business branding requirements. These Sub-CAs, which are part of the same legal entity as the CA, issue certificates to end entities or Subscribers. The list of Sub-CAs is available at <https://speedsignca.com>

### 1.3.2. PKI Services

- (i) Certificate Services:Based on the assurance level requirements, CA issues various classes of Certificates.The category of certificates includes individual, organizational person, and special types of certificates. These special types of Certificates include System Certificates, Document Signer, Encryption, etc. The certificates are issued subject to the verification requirements specified under CCA-IVG
- (ii) CRL Services:CA makes available CRL on <https://speedsignca.com> freely downloadable by Subscribers and Relying Parties
- (iii) OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) Validation Services:CA provides OCSP validation services to Relying Parties for certificate status verification in realtime. The OCSP service of the CA is operated as per CCA-OCSP
- (iv) eSign online Digital Signature Services: CA is empanelled as ESP to offer eSign online Digital Signature Service as per the CCA-EAUTH. e-KYC class of certificates will be issued as stated under CCA-CP.

eSign-Online Digital Signature Services is based on online Aadhaar eKYC or eKYC by CA. For CA eKYC-based eSign service or issuance of DSC, applicants are required

to create an eKYC account with CA. Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA carries out the verification based on the following modes mentioned in CCA-IVG

1. Off-line Aadhaar eKYC,
2. PAN eKYC,
3. Organizational KYC and
4. Foreign National KYC

Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA is also empanelled to provide eSign Services. The DSCs are issued to applicants for document signing provided through the eSign Service of CA. The applicants are electronically authenticated to the eKYC services of CA or other specified eKYC services by CCA. CA provides a direct interface to the applicant for providing authentication information and also for accessing eKYC information retained in the CA eKYC database. CA issues short-validity Digital Signature Certificates of 30 minutes to eSign users directly. After the generation of DSC and signature creation, ESP of CA ensures that the private keys are destroyed immediately. The Subscriber's private key storage requirements are not applicable in this mode of DSC issuance.

CA does not suspend or revoke eKYC classes of Digital Signature Certificates. However, the CA maintains a null Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in its repository to satisfy the requirements of relying party applications. CRL is signed by the issuing CA. Similarly, re-key and renewal do not apply to eKYC classes of Digital Signature Certificates

The identity and address of the DSC applicant are obtained based on the authentication of the DSC applicant to the eKYC service. To retain the eKYC of the applicant by CA, the process of the applicant's identity verification is followed as specified under CCA-IVG. In the case of external eKYC service, the response received from the eKYC provider will be accepted provided with eKYC provider provides an eKYC response directly to CA upon the authentication by the applicant. The list of approved eKYC providers is specified by CCA and listed in CCA-eAUTH.

ESP of CA facilitates DSC application form generation; key generation of DSC applicant based on the authentication provided by the DSC applicant and ensures that the applicant's identity information and public key are properly bound. Additionally, the CA records the process that was followed for the issuance of each certificate. The process documentation and authentication requirements are as specified in the CCA-eAUTH and CCA-IVG

Once the verification of the applicant is carried out and recorded in the CA eKYC database, the issuance of eKYC classes of DSC is implemented in an automated environment with the requirement of authentication of the applicant to the eKYC database. Issuance of eKYC classes and Class1-3 of DSCs are carried out from separate certificate issuance systems.

The users of the Application Service Provider (ASP) interface with ESP of CA for Signature and DSC issuance through the ASP gateway. ASPs are registered with the ESP of CA after a verification process. CA verifies the source of the request and authenticates users directly for each certificate request received from ASP before DSC issuance. Certificates are electronically verified to ensure that all the fields and extensions are properly populated. The certificates are of one-time use and the issued certificates are achieved. The private keys of applicants are destroyed



immediately after certificate generation and signature function. The signatures along with the certificate are delivered to the end entity Subscribers.

In the case of issuance of eKYC classes of DSC to the users of eSign Service, the requirements specified above will override the requirements specified for Class 1-3 in the respective sections of this CPS

(v) Time Stamping Service: CA Provides Time Stamping Service as perCCA-TSP.

### 1.3.3. Registration Authority (RA)

Registration Authority is a business partner of the CA and facilitates business-related activities of CA.

### 1.3.4. Subscribers

A Subscriber is an entity whose name appears as the subject in a certificate, who asserts that it uses its key and certificate following the certificate policy asserted in the certificate, and who does not itself issue certificates.

### 1.3.5. Relying Parties

A Relying Party is the entity that relies on the validity of the binding of the Subscriber's name to a public key. The Relying Party is responsible for deciding whether or how to check the validity of the certificate by checking the appropriate certificate status information. The Relying Party can use the certificate to verify the integrity of a digitally signed message or to identify the creator of a message. A Relying Party may use information in the certificate (such as certificate policy identifiers) to determine the suitability of the certificate for a particular use.

### 1.3.6. Applicability

Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA issues the following classes of certificates. The Assurance level and Applicability as defined under India PKI CP are given below

Assurance Level	Assurance	Applicability
Class 1	Class 1 certificates shall be issued for both business personnel and private individuals' use. These certificates will confirm that the information in the application provided by the Subscriber does not conflict with the information in well-recognized consumer databases.	This provides a basic level of assurance relevant to environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance.
Class 2	These certificates will be issued for both business personnel and private individuals. These certificates will confirm that the information in the application provided by the	This level is relevant to environments where risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may include transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of

	Subscriber does not conflict with the information in well-recognized consumer databases.	fraud, or involving access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is substantial
Class 3	This certificate will be issued to individuals as well as organizations. As these are high assurance certificates, primarily intended for e-commerce applications, they shall be issued to individuals only on their personal (physical) appearance before the Certifying Authorities.	This level is relevant to environments where threats to data are high or the consequences of the failure of security services are high. This may include very high-value transactions or high levels of fraud risk.
eKYC - Single Factor	eKYC -Single Factor class of certificates shall be issued based on Single Factor authentication of the Subscriber to the applicable eKYC services. These certificates will confirm that the information in the Digital Signature certificate provided by the Subscriber is the same as the information retained in the eKYC databases of the Subscriber	This level is relevant to environments where Single-factor authentication to eKYC service is an acceptable method for credential verification before issuance of DSC. Certificate holders' private keys are created on hardware and destroyed immediately after one-time usage at this assurance level.
eKYC - Multi-Factor	eKYC -Multi-Factor class of certificates shall be issued based on Multi-Factor authentication of the Subscriber to the applicable eKYC services. These certificates will confirm that the information in the Digital Signature certificate provided by the Subscriber's name as the information retained in the eKYC databases of the Subscriber.	This level is relevant to environments where Multi-Factor authentication to eKYC service is an acceptable method for credential verification before issuance of DSC. Certificate holder's private keys are created on hardware and destroyed immediately after one-time usage at this assurance level

## 1.4. Certificate Usage

### 1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

Certificate usage is governed by the IT Act of 2000 and the Interoperability Guidelines published by CCA.

### 1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificate usage is governed by the IT Act of 2000 and the Interoperability Guidelines published by CCA.

## 1.5. Policy Administration

### **1.5.1. The organization administering the document**

This CPS is administered by CA and is revised with the approval of CCA.

### **1.5.2. Contact Person**

CA can be contacted at the following address.

#### **Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd**

Phone: +91 9602343848

Email: info@speedsignca.com

For more information or for feedback:

Visit Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA

Website at <https://speedsignca.com>

Contact : info@speedsignca.com

### **1.5.3. Person Determining Certification Practice Statement Suitability for the Policy**

The determination of the suitability of a CPS will be based on an independent auditor's results and recommendations.

### **1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures**

The CCA approves the CPS of the CA and the auditor's assessment will also be taken into account.

### **1.5.5. Waivers**

There are no waivers to this CPS.

## **2. Publication & PKI Repository Responsibilities**

### **2.1. PKI Repositories**

CA maintains Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or LDAP-based repositories that contain the following information:

1. CA Certificates
  - a. Issued to their sub-CAs
2. Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
  - a. Issued by the Licensed CA
  - b. Issued by their sub-CAs
3. Digital Signature Certificates issued by/sub-CA

#### **2.1.1. Repository Obligations**

CA maintains a repository and is available at <https://www.speedsignca.com/repository>

## **2.2. Publication of Certificate Information**

### **2.2.1. Publication of CA Information**

See Section 2.1.

### **2.2.2. Interoperability**

See Section 2.1.

## **2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication**

CA Certificates and CRLs are published as specified in this CPS in Section 4.

## **2.4. Access Controls on PKI Repositories**

The PKI Repository information which is not intended for public dissemination or modification is protected.

### **3. Identification & Authentication**

The requirements for identification and authentication are specified under the Information Technology Act, Rules and Guidelines issued thereunder. Before issuing a Certificate, the CA ensure that all Subject information in the Certificate conforms to the requirements that have been verified as per the procedures prescribed in this CPS.

#### **3.1. Naming**

##### **3.1.1. Types of Names**

CAs issue certificates containing an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN) in the Issuer and Subject fields. Subject Alternative Name may also be used if marked non-critical. Further requirements for name forms are specified in [CCA-IOG].

##### **3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful**

The certificates issued under this CPS take care of the following

- (i) Names used in the certificates identify the person or object to which they are assigned in a meaningful way.
- (ii) The DNs and associated directory information trees reflect organizational structures.
- (iii) The common name represents the Subscriber in a way that is easily understandable by humans. For people, this will typically be a legal name. For equipment, this may be a model name and serial number, or an application process

##### **3.1.3. Anonymity of Subscribers**

CA does not issue Subscriber certificates with anonymous identities.

##### **3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms**

Rules for interpreting name forms comply with the applicable Standards.

##### **3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names**

Name uniqueness for interoperability or trustworthiness is enforced in association with the serial number or unique identifier.

##### **3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication & Role of Trademarks**

No stipulation.

##### **3.1.7. Name Claim Dispute Resolution Procedure**

The CA resolves any name collisions (in association with the serial number or unique identifier) brought to its attention that may affect interoperability or trustworthiness.

## **3.2. Initial Identity Validation**

### **3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key**

In all cases where the DSC applicant named in a certificate generates its keys, the DSC applicant is required to prove possession of the private key, which corresponds to the public key in the certificate request. This will be performed by the DSC applicant using its private key to sign a value and provide that value to the issuing CA. The CA then validates the signature using the DSC applicant public key.

### **3.2.2. Authentication of Organization user Identity**

Requests for certificates in the name of an organizational user are mandated to include the user name, organization name, address, and documentation providing the existence of the organisation verifies the information relating to the authenticity of the requesting representative as per the requirements mentioned under CCA-IVG.

### **3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity**

CA follows the process of the applicant's identity verification as specified under CCA-IVG. CA provides a software interface for key generation by DSC applicants and ensures that the applicant's identity information and public key are properly bound. Additionally, the CA records the process that was followed for the issuance of each certificate. Process information depends upon the certificate level of assurance and is addressed in the applicable CPS. The process documentation and authentication requirements include the following:

1. The identity of the person performing the identity verification;
2. A signed declaration by that person on the application is that he or she verified the identity of the applicant;
3. The applicant is required to present one photo ID and also an attested document as proof of residential address.
4. Unique identifying numbers from the Identifier (ID) of the verifier and an ID of the applicant;
5. The date and time of the verification; and
6. A declaration of identity signed by the applicant using a handwritten signature or equivalent per Indian Laws.
7. Identity is established by in-person proofing before CA or an equivalent mechanism like Aadhaar authentication or online Video Verification. To confirm identities; the information provided by whom is verified to ensure legitimacy.

#### **3.2.3.1. Authentication of Component Identities**

Requests are accepted from the human sponsor in the case of computing and communications components (routers, firewalls, servers, etc.), which are named as the

certificate subject. The human sponsor will be responsible for providing the following registration information:

1. Equipment identification (e.g., serial number) or service name (e.g., Domain Name Service (DNS) name)
2. Equipment public keys
3. Contact information to enable CA to communicate with the sponsor when required
4. Additional authentication requirements for the issuance of SSL certificates are mentioned under the guidelines CCA-SSL

### **3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information**

CA does not include non-verified Information provided by DSC applicants in certificates.

### **3.2.5. Validation of Authority**

Certificates that contain explicit or implicit organizational affiliation are issued only after ascertaining the applicant has the authorization to act on behalf of the organization in the asserted capacity. The procedure followed by CA to establish the applicant's affiliation with the organization is as specified under CCA-IVG.

### **3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation**

Certificates are issued by following CCA-IOG to ensure interoperability.

## **3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests**

### **3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key**

The Subscribers have to undergo a fresh identity-proofing process for the period for which the certificate has been issued. The maximum time for which initial identity-proofing can be relied upon for issuance of a fresh certificate is as per the table below:

<b>Assurance Level</b>	<b>Initial Identity Proofing</b>
Class 1	2 Years
Class 2	2 Years
Class 3	2 Years

When the current Signing Key is used for identification and authentication purposes, the life of the new certificate will not exceed the initial identity-proofing period specified in the table above.

### **3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation**

If a certificate has been revoked, CA issues a fresh certificate to the Subscriber only after the initial registration process described in Section 3.2 to obtain a new certificate.

### **3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request**

Revocation requests are authenticated in the following manner.

1. Electronic requests to revoke a certificate authenticated using that certificate's associated public key, regardless of whether or not the private key has been compromised.
2. In case the possession of the key is not with the Subscriber, suspend/revoke the certificate after verifying the Subscriber's identity.
3. In the case where the Subscriber is not in a position to communicate (death, unconscious state, mental disorder), revoke the certificate after verification

## **4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements**

Communication among the CA, RA, and Subscriber is implemented with requisite security services (i.e., source authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, or confidentiality) applied to them commensurate with the assurance level of the certificate being managed.

Physical documents are packaged and transported in a tamper-evident manner by a certified mail carrier to meet integrity and confidentiality requirements.

When cryptography is used, CA implemented the mechanism, at least as strong as the certificates being managed, to secure the website using a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificate and set it up with appropriate algorithms and key sizes to satisfy the integrity and confidentiality requirements for certificate management.

Based on the content of communication, all, or none of the security services are enforced.

### **4.1. Certificate requests**

The applicant intending to obtain DSC from CA needs to submit a DSC application form filled with identity details, address, photo, and signature with duly attested supporting documents to CA. On receipt of the request and information in the prescribed format, CA carries out the verification of documents and Video and Mobile number verification if applicable. The detailed requirements for each category of DSC applicants are specified under CCA-IVG.

A signed declaration by the person performing the identity verification is recorded on the DSC application form that he or she verified the identity of the applicant.

Upon the approval of the CA trusted person for the DSC application request, the DSC is issued to the DSC applicant. The DSCs are published on the repository of the CA, on acceptance by the Subscriber.

#### **4.1.1. Submission of Certificate Application**

The DSC applicant is required to submit the duly filled DSC application form along with the supporting documents to CA. The application forms for various types of certificates are available on the CA website at <https://speedsignca.com>

#### **4.1.2. Enrolment Process and Responsibilities**

For certificates, all end-user applicants undergo an enrolment process consisting of:



- Completing and submitting a certificate application form and providing the required information,
- Generating a key pair.
- Delivering his/ her, or its public key to CA
- Demonstrating to CA that the certificate applicant has possession of the private key corresponding to the public key delivered to CA.
- Manifesting assent to the relevant Subscriber agreement.

## **4.2. Certificate Application Processing**

CA verifies the information in certificate applications is accurate based on the attested supporting documents, telephonic interaction, Video Verification, and other procedures specified under CCA-IVG.

### **4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions**

See Section 3.2.3 and subsections thereof.

### **4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications**

Certificate Applications submitted to the CA for processing could result in either approval or denial.

## **4.3. Certificate Issuance**

After a certificate applicant submits a certificate application, the CA verifies or refutes the information in the certificate application. Upon successful verification based on all required authentication procedures for various classes of certificates, forward the certificate application for approval. The applicant's request for certificate issuance is reviewed by a trusted person which may result in approval or denial of the certificate.

The responses received from publicly available databases, used to confirm Subscriber information, are protected from unauthorized modification.

### **4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance**

CA verifies the source of a certificate request before issuance. If the crypto medium is used for the key generation and storage, the details such as make, model, serial no, etc are also recorded. Certificates are checked to ensure that all fields and extensions are properly populated. After generation, verification, and acceptance, the CA publishes the certificate in the repository.

### **4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance**

CA will notify the subject (End Entity Subscriber) of certificate issuance through email/SMS and internet link.

## **4.4. Certificate Acceptance**

### **4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

The DSC applicant must confirm acceptance of the certificate upon notification of issuance by the CA. Notification and link are sent to the Subscriber for downloading the certificate. The content of the certificate will be displayed to the Subscriber along with the download option. Downloading the certificate constitutes the Subscriber's acceptance of the certificate.

### **4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

See Section 2.1.

### **4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

No Stipulation.

## **4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

### **4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

Subscribers are liable to protect their private keys from access by any other party. For individual Signature certificates, Subscribers are required to generate key pairs in FIPS 140-2 level 2 crypto devices.

Subscribers are also required to use their private keys for the purposes as constrained by the extensions (such as key usage, extended key usage, certificate policies, etc.) in the certificates issued to them.

### **4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

Relying Parties are required to use public key certificates and associated public keys for the purposes as constrained by the extensions (such as key usage, extended key usage, certificate policies, etc.) in the certificates.

## **4.6. Certificate Renewal**

Renewing a certificate means creating a new certificate with the same name, for the time remaining in validity and other information as the old one, but a new, extended validity period and a new serial number. Certificates are renewed by CA only if the public key has not reached the end of its validity period, the associated private key has not been compromised, and the Subscriber name and attributes are unchanged.

### **4.6.1. Circumstances for Certificate Renewal**

A certificate may be renewed if the public key has not reached the end of its validity period, the associated private key has not been revoked or compromised, and the Subscriber name

and attributes are unchanged. Requests for renewal of certificates are not accepted by CA at present due to the constraint present in the CCA-IVG.

#### **4.6.2. Who may Request Renewal**

In a normal scenario,

- A Subject may request the renewal of its certificate.
- A PKI Sponsor may request renewal of the component certificate.
- A CA may request renewal of its Subscriber certificates, e.g., when the CA re-keys.

#### **4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests**

In the normal scenario, a certificate renewal will be using one of the following processes:

1. The initial registration process as described in Section 3.2; or
2. Identification & Authentication for Re-key as described in Section 3.3, except the old key can also be used as the new key.

#### **4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

See Section 4.3.2.

#### **4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate**

See Section 4.4.1.

#### **4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA**

See Section 4.4.2.

#### **4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

See Section 4.4.3.

### **4.7. Certificate Re-Key**

Re-keying a certificate means that a new certificate is created that has the same characteristics and level as the old one, except that the new certificate has a new, different public key (corresponding to a new, different private key) and a different serial number, and it may be assigned a different validity period. At present, CA does not offer a certificate Re-Key option to Subscribers.

#### **4.7.1. Circumstances for Certificate Re-key**

CA issue a new certificate to the Subject when the Subject has generated a new key pair and is entitled to a certificate subject to the requirements set forth under CCA-IVG.

#### **4.7.2. Who may Request Certification of a New Public Key**

A Subscriber may request the re-key of its certificate.

A PKI Sponsor may request a re-key of the component certificate.

#### **4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests**

A certificate re-key is achieved using one of the following processes:

1. The initial registration process as described in Section 3.2; or
2. Identification & Authentication for Re-key as described in Section 3.3.

#### **4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

See Section 4.3.2.

#### **4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate**

See Section 4.4.1.

#### **4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA**

See Section 4.4.2.

#### **4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

See Section 4.4.3.

#### **4.8. Certificate Modification**

No Stipulation

#### **4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

CA authenticates the request for revocation before revocation. Subscribers are required to submit revocation requests as specified under IT CA Rules. Electronic requests to revoke a certificate have to be authenticated using that certificate's associated private key, regardless of whether or not the private key has been compromised.

##### **4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation of a Certificate**

A certificate is revoked when the binding between the subject and the subject's public key defined within a certificate is no longer considered valid. Some of the circumstances that invalidate the binding are:

- Identifying information or affiliation components of any name(s) in the certificate become invalid;
- The Subject can be shown to have violated the stipulations of its agreement with CA;

- The private key is suspected of compromise; or
- The Subject or other authorized party (CPS) asks for the Subscriber's certificate to be revoked.
- The private key is lost
- Subscriber is not in a position to use certificate(Death – a copy of Death certificate made available to CA)

Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, CA revokes the certificate and places it on the CRL. Revoked certificates are included on all new publications of the certificate status information until the certificates expire. CA ensures that the revoked certificate will appear on at least one CRL.

#### **4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation of a Certificate**

A certificate subject, human supervisor of a human subject (for organizational user), Human Resources (HR) person for the human subject (for organizational user), PKI Sponsor for component, or CA, may request revocation of a certificate.

For CA certificates, authorized individuals representing the CA may request the revocation of certificates.

#### **4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request**

CA identifies the certificate to be revoked as mentioned in the request for revocation, the reason for revocation, and verifies the authentication requirements (e.g., digitally or manually signed by the subject). CA may perform Telephonic verification and video verification to ensure the identity of the Subscriber.

Upon receipt of a revocation request, CA authenticates the request and then revokes the certificate.

#### **4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period**

There is no revocation grace period. Responsible parties must request revocation as soon as they identify the need for revocation.

#### **4.9.5. Time within which CA must Process the Revocation Request**

CA makes its best efforts to process revocation requests so that it is posted in the next CRL unless a revocation request is received and approved within two hours of the next CRL generation.

#### **4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties**

The use of revoked certificates could have damaging or catastrophic consequences in certain applications. The matter of how often new revocation data should be obtained is a determination to be made by the Relying Party. If it is temporarily infeasible to obtain revocation information, then the Relying Party must either reject the use of the certificate, or make an

informed decision to accept the risk, responsibility, and consequences for using a certificate whose authenticity cannot be guaranteed to the standards of this policy. Such use may occasionally be necessary to meet urgent operational requirements.

#### **4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency**

CA issues CRLs periodically, even if there are no changes to be made, to ensure the timeliness of the information. Certificate status information may be issued more frequently than the issuance frequency described below.

CA ensures that superseded certificate status information is removed from the PKI Repository upon posting the latest certificate status information.

CA publishes CRLs no later than the next scheduled update.

CA issues CRLs at least once every 24 hours with a minimum validity of 7 days.

In addition, CA issues CRLs and posts the CRL immediately if a certificate is revoked for the reason of a key compromise.

#### **4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs**

CA publishes CRLs immediately after generation. Furthermore, each CRL will be published no later than the time specified in the nextUpdate field of the previously issued CRL. CA issues CRLs at least once every 24 hours, and the nextUpdate time in the CRL may be no later than 7 days after issuance time (i.e., the thisUpdate time).

#### **4.9.9. Online Revocation Checking Availability**

CA supports online certificate status checking. Client software using online certificate status checking need not obtain or process CRLs.

The online revocation/status checking provided by CA meets or exceeds the requirements for CRL issuance stated in 4.9.7.

#### **4.9.10. Online Revocation Checking Requirements**

No stipulation beyond Section 7.3.

#### **4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

Other than the implementation of CRLs and online revocation status, no other forms of online revocation status will be provided by the CA

##### **4.9.11.1. Checking Requirements for Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements**

No stipulation.

##### **4.9.11.2. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

None beyond those stipulated in Section 4.9.7.

#### **4.9.12. Circumstances for Suspension**

The suspension will be permitted if a user's token holding a private key is temporarily unavailable to them.

#### **4.9.13. Who can Request a Suspension**

A human Subscriber, human supervisor of a human Subscriber (organizational user), or Human Resources (HR) person for the human Subscriber (organizational user), issuing CA, may request suspension of a certificate.

#### **4.9.14. Procedure for Suspension Request**

The requester submitting a request to suspend a certificate should provide the information to identify the certificate to be suspended, explain the reason for suspension, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed).

The reason code CRL entry extension will be populated with "certificate Hold" by CA. The Hold Instruction Code CRL entry extension will be absent.

#### **4.9.15. Limits on Suspension Period**

A certificate may only be suspended for up to 15 days. If the Subscriber has not removed their certificate from hold (suspension) within that period, the certificate will be revoked for the reason of "Key Compromise".

To mitigate the threat of an unauthorized person removing the certificate from hold, the Subscriber identity will be authenticated in person using the initial identity proofing process described in Section 3.2.3.

### **4.10. Certificate Status Services**

CA supports the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) for obtaining the revocation status of X.509 certificates.

#### **4.10.1. Operational Characteristics**

No stipulation.

#### **4.10.2. Service Availability**

Relying Parties are bound to their obligations and the stipulations of this CPS irrespective of the availability of the online certificate status service.

#### **4.10.3. Optional Features**

No stipulation.

#### **4.11. End of Subscription**

No stipulation.

#### **4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery**

##### **4.12.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Under no circumstances end entity signature key will be escrowed by a thirdparty.



## **5. Facility Management & Operational Controls**

### **5.1. Physical Controls**

CA operation premises are actively monitored with redundant power and notification methods. Sensitive areas within the facility, such as power and network connections are also controlled within the protected facility.

The operation site has multiple tiers of security enforced through Photo ID badges, proximity cards, and biometric access devices. All visitors are escorted by trusted persons and every visitor signs the visitor's log.

The facility is continually staffed (24x7), either by trusted persons or by an on-site guard service during non-business hours.

#### **5.1.1. Site Location & Construction**

The system components and operation of CA are contained within a physically protected environment to deter, detect and prevent unauthorized use of, access to, or disclosure of sensitive information. The physical security standards are modelled as per the physical and operational security guidelines mentioned in the Information Technology Act.

CA's primary site consists of the physical security tiers comprising of:

Tier 1 – The security personnel at the building, where the facility is located forms the first level of security. Security guards at the entrance and allows Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd employees and persons having valid gate pass. Pass with photo is issued for visitors after checking id proof and valid permission.

Tier 2 - The entry to the datacenter building which is the entry point to the CA-facility located, forms second level of security. This is manned by physical security personnel and also performs physical checking. The entry is restricted by access cards. Visitors are escorted by Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd trusted persons.

Tier 3 - Entry to the common data enter area where Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA facility is located forms the third layer . The entry to data enter is also manned by physical security personnel. The entry is restricted only to authorized personnel having valid Biometric Access. CA Trusted Members are required to make an entry in the register (R1) before proceeding to Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA facility.

Tier 4 - Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA facility is housed in a cage having access only to CA Trusted Members . Minimum two Trusted Members are required for opening the door which is the entry to this CA facility. The gate is made of steel and access is restricted through two factor authentication (4 eye biometrics and physical proximity cards). The subsequent internal tiers are located inside CA facility where Certificate issuance and revocation is done which houses the CA servers. The HSM housing CA keys are secured with multi-person access control in this area. The Key Ceremony is also done here.

## **5.1.2. Physical Access**

### **5.1.2.1. CA Physical Access**

CA has implemented a mechanism to protect equipment from unauthorized access.

The physical security requirements laid down for the CA equipment are:

1. No unauthorized access to the hardware is permitted
2. All removable media and paper containing sensitive plain-text information are stored in secure containers
3. All entries/exits are monitored either manually or electronically.
4. access logs are maintained and inspected periodically
5. Multiple layers of increasing security are provided in areas such as the perimeter, building, and CA room
6. Two-person physical access controls are required to both the cryptographic module and computer system for CAs issuing Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 certificates.

### **5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning**

CAs secure facilities are equipped with primary and backup power systems to ensure continuous, uninterrupted access to electric power and also these secure facilities are equipped with air conditioning systems to control temperature and relative humidity.

PKI Repositories are provided with Uninterrupted Power sufficient for a minimum of 24 hours of operation in the absence of commercial power, to support the continuity of operations.

### **5.1.4. Water Exposures**

CA locations are reasonably protected against floods and other damaging exposure to water.

### **5.1.5. Fire Prevention & Protection**

CA facility is equipped to prevent and extinguish fires. Appropriate procedures have also been implemented to minimize the damage due to smoke and fire exposure. These measures also meet all applicable fire safety regulations.

### **5.1.6. Media Storage**

All media containing production software and data, audit, archive, or backup information are stored within CA facilities and also in a secure off-site storage facility with appropriate physical and logical access controls designed to limit access to only authorized personnel and protect such media from accidental damage (e.g., water, fire, and electromagnetic exposure).

### **5.1.7. Waste Disposal**

Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal. Media used to collect or transmit sensitive information are rendered unreadable before disposal. Cryptographic

devices are physically destroyed or zeroed following the manufacturer's guidance before disposal. Other wastes are disposed of by following the CA's normal waste disposal requirements.

#### **5.1.8. Off-Site backup**

Full system backups of the CAs sufficient to recover from system failure, are created on a periodic schedule, and incrementally backup copies are stored at an offsite location. Backups are performed and stored off-site not less than once every 7 days. The data is properly secured based on the classification of data, which is defined by the Certifying Authority in the security policy.

### **5.2. Procedural Controls**

#### **5.2.1. Trusted Roles**

CA ensures that

1. The person filling the role is trustworthy and properly trained.
2. The functions are distributed among more than one person so any malicious activity would require collusion.

CA operations are carried out by four roles which are listed below:

1. CA Administrator – authorized to install, configure, and maintain the CA; establish and maintain user accounts; configure profiles and audit parameters; and generate keys and tunnel for section system communication.
2. CA Officer – authorized to verify and approve certificates or certificate revocations.
3. Audit Administrator – authorized to view and maintain audit logs.
4. System Administrator – authorized to perform system backup and recovery.

The following sections define these and other trusted roles.

##### **5.2.1.1. CA Administrator**

The administrator is responsible for:

1. Installation, configuration, and maintenance of the CA;
2. Establishing and maintaining CA system accounts;
3. Configuring certificate profiles or templates and audit parameters, and;
4. Generating and backing up CA keys.

Administrators will not issue certificates to Subscribers.

##### **5.2.1.2. CA Officer**

The CA officer is responsible for issuing certificates, that is:

1. Registering new Subscribers and requesting the issuance of certificates;
2. Verifying the identity of Subscribers and the accuracy of the information included in certificates;
3. Approving and executing the issuance of certificates, and;
4. Requesting, approving, and executing the revocation of certificates.

### **5.2.1.3. Audit Administrator**

The Audit Administrator is responsible for:

1. Reviewing, maintaining, and archiving audit logs;
2. Performing or overseeing internal compliance audits to ensure that the CA is operating following its CPS;

### **5.2.1.4. System Administrator**

The System Administrator is responsible for the routine operation of the CA equipment and operations such as system backups and recovery or changing recording media.

### **5.2.1.5. Registration Authority**

A Registration Authority (RA) functions as a business partner of the Certifying Authority.

### **5.2.1.6. PKI Sponsor**

A PKI Sponsor fills the role of a Subscriber for non-human system components that are named public key certificate subjects. The PKI Sponsor works with the CAs to register components (routers, firewalls, etc.) by following Section 3.2.3.1 and is responsible for meeting the obligations of Subscribers as defined throughout this document.

## **5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task**

Separate individuals are identified for each trusted role to ensure the integrity of the CA operations. Two or more persons are required to perform the following tasks for CAs that issue Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 certificates:

1. CA key generation;
2. CA signing key activation; and
3. CA private key backup.

In addition, sensitive CA operations like operations of the cryptographic units and certificate manager require the m-out-of-n control to handle the operations of these sensitive functions. Also, split control is implemented to ensure segregation between physical and logical access to systems. Personnel having secret shares do not have physical access and vice-versa. All roles are assigned to multiple persons to support the continuity of operations.

## **5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role**

All personnel seeking to become trusted persons are required to be on the payroll of CA. Thorough background checks are carried out before engaging such personnel for CA Operations. The Certifying Authority follows the procedures approved by management for the background check and they are documented for audit purposes.

CA ensures that personnel has achieved trusted status and approval has been given before such personnel is:

- Issued access devices and granted access to the required facilities

- Issued electronic credentials to access and perform specific functions on CA's IT systems.

#### **5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

##### **5.2.4.1. Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3**

Role separation is enforced either by the CA equipment, procedurally or by both means. Individuals may assume more than one role, except:

1. Individuals who assume an Officer role will not assume a CA Administrator or Audit Administrator role;
2. Individuals who assume an Audit Administrator role will not assume any other role on the CA; and
3. Under no circumstances any of the four roles will perform its compliance audit function.

No individual will be assigned more than one identity.

#### **5.3. Personnel Controls**

##### **5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements**

All persons filling trusted roles will be selected based on trustworthiness, and integrity, and are subject to a background investigation. Personnel will be appointed to trusted roles (CA trusted roles) based on:

1. Having completed an appropriate training program;
2. Having demonstrated the ability to perform their duties;
3. Being trustworthy;
4. Having no other duties that would interfere or conflict with their duties for the trusted role;
5. Having not been previously relieved of duties for reasons of negligence or non-performance of duties;
6. Having not been denied a security clearance, or had a security clearance revoked for cause;
7. Having not been convicted of an offence; and
8. Being appointed in writing by an appointing authority.

##### **5.3.2. Background Check Procedures**

All persons filling trusted roles (including CA trusted roles) should have completed a favourable background investigation. The scope of the background check includes the following areas covering the past five years:

1. Employment;
2. Education (Regardless of the date of award, the highest educational degree is verified);
3. Place of residence (3 years);
4. Law Enforcement; and
5. References

The results of these checks will not be released except as required in Sections 9.3 and 9.4

The background will be verified every three years.

### **5.3.3. Training Requirements**

CA ensures that all personnel performing duties concerning the operation of a CA receive comprehensive training. Training will be conducted in the following areas:

1. CA security principles and mechanisms
2. All PKI software versions in use on the CA system
3. All PKI duties they are expected to perform
4. Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures.
5. Subscriber verification requirements

### **5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

Training (awareness) is conducted to make the trusted personnel aware of any significant change to the operations, and the executions of such plans are documented. Such changes are CA software or hardware upgrades, changes in automated security systems, and relocation of equipment.

Periodic security awareness and any new technology changes training is provided on an ongoing basis, based on the newer versions or releases of the products.

### **5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

No stipulation.

### **5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

CA will take appropriate administrative and disciplinary actions against personnel who violate this policy. The action was taken and will be documented.

### **5.3.7. Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

All the relevant documents relating to CA operation required for trusted personnel to perform their duties such as Certificate Policy, the applicable CPS, Verification Guidelines, user Manuals, Administrator Manual, policies or contracts, etc are made available to CA personnel to maintain the documents identifying all personnel who received training and the level of training completed.

## **5.4. Audit Logging Procedures**

Audit log files are generated for all events relating to the security of the CAs. The security audit logs are either automatically collected or if not possible, a logbook, paper form, or other physical mechanism is used. All security audit logs, both electronic and non-electronic, are retained and made available during compliance audits. The security audit logs for each auditable event defined in this section are maintained by following Section 5.5.2.

### 5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded

All security auditing capabilities of the CA operating system and the CA applications required by this CPS are enabled. Each audit record includes the following (either recorded automatically or manually for each auditable event):

1. The type of event,
2. The date and time the event occurred,
3. Success or failure where appropriate, and
4. The identity of the entity and/or operator that caused the event.

The following events are audited:

Auditable Event	CA
<b>SECURITY AUDIT</b>	
Any changes to the Audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of event audited	
Any attempt to delete or modify the Audit logs	
<b>IDENTITY-PROOFING</b>	
Successful and unsuccessful attempts to assume a role	
The value of the <i>maximum number of authentication attempts</i> is changed	
The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the maximum <i>authentication attempts</i> during user login	
An Administrator unlocks an account that has been locked as a result of unsuccessful authentication attempts	
An Administrator changes the type of authenticator, e.g., from a password to a biometric	
<b>LOCAL DATA ENTRY</b>	
All security-relevant data that is entered into the system	
<b>REMOTE DATA ENTRY</b>	
All security-relevant messages that are received by the system	
<b>DATA EXPORT AND OUTPUT</b>	
All successful and unsuccessful requests for confidential and security-relevant information	
<b>KEY GENERATION</b>	
Whenever the Component generates a key (not mandatory for single session or one-time use symmetric keys)	
<b>PRIVATE KEY LOAD AND STORAGE</b>	
The loading of Component private keys	

Auditable Event	CA
All access to certificate subject Private Keys retained within the CA for key recovery purposes	
<b>TRUSTED PUBLIC KEY ENTRY, DELETION, AND STORAGE</b>	
All changes to the trusted Component Public Keys, including additions and deletions	
<b>PRIVATE AND SECRET KEY EXPORT</b>	
The export of private and secret keys (keys used for a single session or message are excluded)	
<b>CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION</b>	
All certificate requests	
<b>CERTIFICATE REVOCATION</b>	
All certificate revocation requests	
<b>CERTIFICATE STATUS CHANGE APPROVAL</b>	
The approval or rejection of a certificate status change request	
<b>CONFIGURATION</b>	
Any security-relevant changes to the configuration of the Component	
<b>ACCOUNT ADMINISTRATION</b>	
Roles and users are added or deleted	
The access control privileges of a user account or a role are modified	
<b>CERTIFICATE PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>	
All changes to the certificate profile	
<b>CERTIFICATE STATUS PROVIDERMANAGEMENT</b>	
All changes to the CSP profile (e.g. OCSP profile)	
<b>REVOCATION PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>	
All changes to the revocation profile	
<b>CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST PROFILE MANAGEMENT</b>	
All changes to the certificate revocation list profile	
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	
Appointment of an individual to a Trusted Role	
Designation of personnel for multiparty control	
Installation of the Operating System	
Installation of the PKI Application	



<b>Auditable Event</b>	<b>CA</b>
Installation of hardware cryptographic modules	
Removal of hardware cryptographic modules	
Destruction of cryptographic modules	
System Start-up	
Logon attempts to PKI Application	
Receipt of hardware/software	
Attempts to set passwords	
Attempts to modify passwords	
Backup of the internal CA database	
Restoration from a backup of the internal CA database	
File manipulation (e.g., creation, renaming, moving)	
Posting of any material to a PKI Repository	
Access to the internal CA database	
All certificate compromise notification requests	
Loading tokens with certificates	
Shipment of Tokens	
Zeroing Tokens	
Re-key of the Component	
<b>CONFIGURATION CHANGES</b>	
Hardware	
Software	
Operating System	
Patches	
Security Profiles	
<b>PHYSICAL ACCESS / SITE SECURITY</b>	
Personnel Access to Room Housing Component	
Access to the Component	
Known or suspected violations of physical security	
<b>ANOMALIES</b>	
Software error conditions	
Software check integrity failures	

Auditable Event	CA
Receipt of improper messages	
Misrouted messages	
Network attacks (suspected or confirmed)	
Equipment failure	
Electrical power outages	
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) failure	
Obvious and significant network service or access failures	
Violations of Certificate Policy	
Violations of Certification Practice Statement	
Resetting the Operating System clock	

#### 5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Audit Logs

Audit logs are examined for key security and operational events at least every week. In addition, CA reviews its audit logs as required in the event of any suspicious or unusual activity based on irregularities and incidents within CA systems.

The processing of audit logs includes a review of the audit logs and a recording of significant events in an audit log summary. It includes a verification that the log has not been tampered with, a brief inspection of all log entries, and a detailed investigation of any irregularities in the logs. Actions taken based on audit log reviews are recorded.

#### 5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Logs

See Section 2.

#### 5.4.4. Protection of Audit Logs

System configuration and procedures are implemented together to ensure that:

1. Only authorized people have read access to the logs;
2. Only authorized people may archive audit logs; and,
3. Audit logs are not modified.

After back-up and archiving, the audit logs are allowed by the system to be over-written.

#### 5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit logs and audit summaries are archived as per Section 5.5.1.

#### 5.4.6. Audit Collection System (internal vs. external)

Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application, network, and operating system levels. Manually generated audit data is recorded by CA personnel.

Audit processes are invoked at system start-up and cease only at system shutdown. In the case of failure of the audit collection system, CA operations are suspended until the problem is remedied.

#### **5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

This CPS imposes no requirement to provide notice (that an event was audited) to the individual, organization, device, or application that caused the event.

#### **5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments**

Events in the audit log are recorded, in part, to monitor system vulnerabilities. A vulnerability assessment is performed, reviewed, and revised following an examination of these monitored events.

### **5.5. Records Archival**

#### **5.5.1. Types of Records Archived**

CA retains an archive of information and actions that are material to each certificate application and the creation, Issuance, revocation, expiration, and renewal of each certificate issued by the CA. These records include all relevant evidence regarding:

<b>Data to Be Archived</b>
Certification Practice Statement
Contractual obligations
System and equipment configuration
Modifications and updates to the system or configuration
Certificate requests
Revocation requests
Subscriber identity authentication data as per Section 3.2.3
Documentation of receipt and acceptance of certificates
Documentation of receipt of Tokens
All certificates issued or published
Record of Component CA Re-key
All CRLs and CRLs issued and/or published
All Audit Logs
All Audit Log Summaries

<b>Data to Be Archived</b>
Other data or applications to verify archive contents
Compliance audit reports

### **5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive**

Records associated with certificates are archived for 7 years from the date of expiry of the certificate.

### **5.5.3. Protection of Archive**

CA protects its archived records so that only authorized persons can access the archived data. CA protects the archive against unauthorized viewing, modification, deletion, or other tampering, by storage within a trustworthy system. The media holding the archive data and the systems required to process the archive data are maintained to ensure that the archive data can be accessed for the period

### **5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures**

CA creates backup copies of archives compiled as and when the archives are created. Backup copies of the archive and copies of paper-based records are maintained in an off-site disaster recovery facility.

### **5.5.5. Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records**

Archived records are time-stamped such that the order of events can be determined. Certificates, CRLs, other revocation databases, and usage entries contain time and date information provided by System time, which is synchronized with IST (NPLI).

### **5.5.6. Archive Collection System (internal or external)**

The archive collection system is internal to the CA.

### **5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain & Verify Archive Information**

Only CA-trusted personnel are permitted to access the archived data. Additionally, the archive information may be made available to the CCA upon request.

## **5.6. Key Changeover**

CA keys are changed periodically as stipulated by the IT Act and the key changes are processed as per key generation specified in this CPS. If the CA private key is used to sign CRLs, then the key will be retained and protected.

CA provides reasonable notice to the Subscriber's Relying Parties of any change to a new key pair used by CA to sign digital certificates under its trust hierarchy. The Subscribers are issued digital certificates for a specified period. The Subscribers generate a new private-public key pair and submit the public key along with the new application to the CA for generating a new Certificate, preferably before the existing certificate expires.

The following table provides the lifetimes for certificates and associated private keys.

Key	2048 Bit Keys	
	Private Key	Certificate
Intermediate CA	10 years	10 years
Sub-CA	10 years	10 years
Time Stamping	3 years	3 years
OCSP Responder	1 year	1 year
Human Subscriber Signature	3 years*	3 years
Human Subscriber Encryption	Always	3 years
Device/System	3 years	3 years

\*Subject to technical feasibility.

## 5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery

### 5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

If a CA detects a potential hacking attempt or other forms of compromise, it will perform an investigation to determine the nature and the degree of damage. If the CA key is suspected of compromise, the procedures outlined in Section 5.7.3 will be followed. Otherwise, the scope of potential damage will be assessed to determine if the CA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked, and/or the CA key needs to be declared compromised.

CA will inform CCA if any of the following cases occur:

1. Suspected or detected compromise of the CA system;
2. Physical or electronic attempts to penetrate the CA system;
3. Denial of service attacks on the CA system; or
4. Any incident preventing CA from issuing a CRL within 24 hours of the time specified in the next update field of its currently valid CRL. A CA will make all efforts to restore the capability to issue CRL as quickly as possible.

### 5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are corrupted

CA has a Disaster Recovery Centre as per the guidelines of the IT Act. The disaster recovery site will be made operational using the latest available backup data.

If CA equipment is damaged or rendered inoperative, but the signature keys are not destroyed, CA makes all efforts to establish the operation as quickly as possible, giving priority to the ability to generate CRL or make use of the Disaster Recovery facility for CRL generation.

If both primary and Disaster recovery sites cannot be used to establish revocation capability in a reasonable timeframe, the CA may request for revocation of its certificate(s) to CCA.

### **5.7.3. Private Key Compromise Procedures**

If CA signature keys are compromised, lost, or suspected to be compromised:

CCA will be notified at the earliest feasible time so that RCAI can revoke the CA certificate;

1. A CA key pair will be generated by the CA by following the procedures outlined in this applicable CPS;
2. New CA certificates will be requested as per the initial registration process set elsewhere in this CP;
3. If the CA can obtain accurate information on the certificates it has issued and that are still valid (i.e., not expired or revoked), the CA may re-issue (i.e., renew) those certificates with the not After a date in the certificate as in original certificates; and
4. The CA will also investigate what caused the compromise or loss, and what measures must be taken to preclude recurrence.

### **5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster**

In the case of a disaster whereby CA installation is physically damaged and all copies of the CA Signing Key are destroyed as a result, the CA will request that its certificates be revoked. The CA will follow steps 1 through 4 in Section 5.7.3 above.

### **5.8. CA Termination**

In the event of termination, CA will revoke all certificates issued.

CA will archive all audit logs and other records before termination.

CA will destroy all its private keys upon termination.

## 6. Technical Security Controls

### 6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

#### 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

The following table provides the requirements for key pair generation for the various entities.

Entity	FIPS 140-1/2 Level	Hardware or Software	Generated in Entity Module
CA	3	Hardware	Yes
Sub-CA	3	Hardware	Yes
Time Stamp Authority	3	Hardware	Yes
OCSF Responder	3	Hardware	Yes
Human Subscriber Signature	1 for Class 1 2 for Class 2 & 3	Software for Class 1 Hardware for Class 2 & 3	Yes
Human Subscriber Encryption	1 for Class 1 2 for Class 2 & 3	Software for Class 1 Hardware for Class 2 & 3	No Requirement
Device/System	2 for Class 3	Software for Class 2 Hardware for Class 3	Yes
Document Signer	2 for Class 3	Software for Class 2 Hardware for Class 3	Yes

Multiparty controls are used by CA for key pair generation, as specified in Section 5.2.2.

CA creates a verifiable audit trail for CA key pair generation as per the security requirements that are followed and the same will be documented. The process is validated by an Auditor.

#### 6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

The subscriber private key is generated by the end Subscriber and hence there is no delivery to the end Subscribers. In the case of hardware-based tokens or smart cards, pre-formatted tokens are sent to the Subscribers and the associated PIN is sent by an out-of-band process. The end user then uses the token and the client software provided to him to generate and store the private key and also initiates an online session with the CA server for certificate generation.

#### 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

End-user Subscribers generate a PKCS#10 request containing their public key and send it to the CA. This is accomplished using the client software which initiates an online session with the CA server and delivers the signed certificates to the Subscriber. The online session is secured by SSL.

#### 6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

Speed Sign Technologies Pvt Ltd CA makes its Public Keys available to Relying Parties in a repository available at <https://speedsignca.com>

### 6.1.5. Key Sizes

The key length and hash algorithms used by CA and Subscriber certificates are given below

<b><i>Cryptographic Function</i></b>	<b><i>Cryptographic Algorithm</i></b>
Signature	2048-bit RSA or ECDSA with -p256curve parameter
Hashing	SHA-256

### 6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

RSA and ECC keys are generated by following FIPS 186-2.

### 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

Key usages are covered in certificate profiles defined in CCA-IOG.

## 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

### 6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

The relevant standard for cryptographic modules is FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. The additional requirements for cryptographic modules are covered in CCA-CRYPTO.

The table in Section 6.1.1 summarizes the minimum requirements for cryptographic modules; higher levels may be used.

### 6.2.2. Private Key Multi-Person Control

Use of a CA private signing key requires action by at least two persons.

### 6.2.3. Private Key Escrow

CA creates a backup of its signature keys. These are stored in encrypted form and under the sole custody of CA.

The end entity private keys used solely for decryption are escrowed before the generation of the corresponding certificates. The Subscriber can keep the escrowed keys.

### 6.2.4. Private Key Backup

#### 6.2.4.1. Backup of CA Private Signature Key



CA private signature keys are backed up under the same multi-person control as the original signature key. The number of backup copies is limited to three and securely stored under the same multi-person control as the operational key.

#### **6.2.4.2. Backup of Subscriber Private Signature Key**

The CA is never in possession of the Subscriber's private signing keys.

#### **6.2.5. Private Key Archival**

At the end of the validity period, the CA private key will be destroyed and will not be archived.

#### **6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module**

CA key pairs are generated and secured by hardware cryptographic modules. CA ensures that The CA private keys are backed up securely and transferred in an encrypted form.

#### **6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

CA stores Private Keys in hardware cryptographic modules and keys are not accessible without an authentication mechanism that complies with the FIPS 140-2 rating of the cryptographic module.

#### **6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key**

The user must be authenticated to the cryptographic module before the activation of any private key(s). Acceptable means of authentication include but are not limited to pass-phrases, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), or biometrics. Entry of activation data is protected from disclosure (i.e., the data should not be displayed while it is entered).

#### **6.2.9. Methods of Deactivating Private Key**

The cryptographic module that has been activated is never left unattended or otherwise available for unauthorized access. After use, cryptographic modules are deactivated. After deactivation, the use of the cryptographic modules-based CA key pair requires the presence of the trusted roles with the activation data to reactivate said CA key pair.

#### **6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key**

Private signature keys will be destroyed when they are no longer needed, or when the certificates to which they correspond expire or are revoked. Destroying private keys inside cryptographic modules requires destroying the key(s) inside the HSM using the 'zeroization' function of the cryptographic modules in a manner that any information cannot be used to recover any part of the private key. All the private key back-ups are destroyed in a manner that any information cannot be used to recover any part of the private key. If the functions of

cryptographic modules are not accessible to destroy the key contained inside, then the cryptographic modules will be physically destroyed. The destruction operation is realized in a physically secure environment

#### **6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating**

See Section 6.2.1.

### **6.3. Other Aspects of Key Management**

#### **6.3.1. Public Key Archival**

The public key is archived as part of the certificate archival.

#### **6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods/Key Usage Periods**

See Section 5.6

### **6.4. Activation Data**

#### **6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation**

The activation data used to unlock private keys is protected from disclosure by a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. Activation data holders are responsible for their accountability and protection.

When they are not used, activation data are always stored in a safe for which access is controlled by holders in limited roles.

#### **6.4.2. Activation Data Protection**

The activation data used to unlock private keys is protected from disclosure. After a predetermined number of failed login attempts, a facility to lock the account temporarily has been provided.

The activation data written on paper is stored securely in a safe.

#### **6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data**

CA changes the activation data whenever the HSM is re-keyed or returned from maintenance. Before sending a cryptographic module for maintenance, all sensitive information contained in the cryptographic module is destroyed.

Subscribers are responsible for ensuring the protection of their activation data

### **6.5. Computer Security Controls**

### **6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

The following computer security functions are provided by the operating system, or through a combination of the operating system, software, and physical safeguards.

1. Require authenticated logins for trusted roles
2. Provide Discretionary Access Control
3. Provide a security audit capability
4. Require a trusted path for identification and authentication
5. Provide domain isolation for process
6. Provide self-protection for the operating system

CA computer systems are configured with minimum required accounts and network services. CA has implemented a combination of physical and logical security controls to ensure that the CA administration is not carried out with less than two-person control.

### **6.5.2. Computer Security Rating**

No Stipulation.

## **6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls**

### **6.6.1. System Development Controls**

The system development controls for the CA are as follows:

1. Hardware and software are purchased in such a way as to reduce the likelihood that any particular component was tampered with.
2. All hardware must be shipped or delivered via controlled methods that provide a continuous chain of accountability, from the purchase location to the location of the operation
3. The hardware and software are dedicated to performing the PKI activities. There are no other applications; hardware devices, network connections, or component software installed which are not part of the PKI operation.
4. Proper care is taken to prevent malicious software from being loaded onto the equipment. Only applications required to perform the PKI operations are obtained from sources authorized by local policy.
5. CA hardware and software are scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter.

### **6.6.2. Security Management Controls**

The configuration of the CA system as well as any modification and upgrade are documented and controlled. There is a mechanism for detecting an unauthorized modification to the CA software or configuration. A formal configuration management methodology is used for the installation and ongoing maintenance of the CA system. The CA software, when first loaded, is verified as being supplied by the vendor, with no modifications, and is the version intended for use.

### **6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls**

Capacity demands are monitored and projections of future capacity requirements are made to ensure that adequate processing power and storage are available.

### **6.7. Network Security Controls**

CA employs appropriate security measures to ensure that they are guarded against denial of service and intrusion attacks. Such measures include the use of hardware firewalls, hardware filtering routers, and intrusion detection systems. Unused network ports and services are turned off. Protocols that provide network security attack vector(s) are not permitted through the boundary control devices.

Any boundary control devices used to protect the network on which PKI equipment is hosted will deny all but the necessary services to the PKI equipment even if those services are enabled for other devices on the network.

### **6.8. Time Stamping**

All CA components are regularly synchronized with a time service such as the Indian Standard Time Service. Time derived from the time service is used for establishing the time of:

1. Initial validity time of a Subscriber's Certificate
2. Revocation of a Subscriber's Certificate
3. Posting of CRL updates
4. OCSP

Asserted times are accurate to within three minutes. Electronic or manual procedures are used to maintain the system time. Clock adjustments are auditable events as listed in Section 5.4.1.

## 7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

### 7.1. Certificate Profile

Certificate profiles are listed under CCA-IOG, Annexure III - Reference Certificate Profiles. The CA Certificates issued under this CPS conform to the X-509 Version 3 digital Certificate.

The End User Certificate Profile (issued for personal use) and CA certificate profiles are listed below

#### 1. CA Certificate Profile

CA CERTIFICATE -BASIC FIELDS	
Version	Version 3
Serial number	A positive number of maximum Length 20 bytes and unique to each certificate issued by issuer CA
Signature Algorithm	SHA256 with RSA Encryption (null parameters)
Issuer DN	Subject DN of the issuing CA
Validity	Validity expressed in UTC Time for certificates valid through 2049
Subject DN	The X.500 distinguished name of the entity associated with the public key certified in the subject public key field of the certificate (Common Name (CN),House Identifier, Street Address, State / Province, Postal Code, Organisational Unit (OU),Organisation (O),Country (C) )
Subject Public Key	rsaEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 1}, 2048 RSA Key modulus, public exponent
Signature	Issuer CA's signature
EXTENSIONS	
authorityKeyIdentifier	Identifies the CA certificate that must be used to verify the CA certificate. It contains the subjectKeyIdentifier of the issuing CA certificate
subjectKeyIdentifier	the unique value associated with the Public key
basicConstraints	CA Boolean = True, pathLenConstraints 0
keyUsage	keyCertSign and cRLSign
certificatePolicies	The value must contain the OID representing the India PKI certificate policy the certificate is valid. (Policy Identifier=2.16.356.100.2)
cRLDistributionPoints	location of CRL information
authorityInfoAccess	location of OCSP Responder (only required if OCSP is needed to check the revocation status of CA Certificate)

#### 2. User Certificate Profile(personal)

END ENTITY CERTIFICATE -BASIC FIELDS	
Version	Version 3
Serial number	A positive number of maximum Length 20 bytes and unique to each certificate issued by an issuer CA
Signature Algorithm	SHA256 with RSA Encryption (null parameters) or

	ECDSA with SHA256 {1 2 840 10045 4 3 2}
Issuer DN	Subject DN of the issuing CA
Validity	Validity expressed in UTC Time for certificates valid through 2049
Subject DN	The X.500 distinguished name of the entity associated with the public key certified in the subject public key field of the certificate ( Common Name, Serial Number, State or Province Name, Postal Code, Telephone number, Pseudonym, Organisation, Country)
Subject Public Key	rsaEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 1}, 2048 RSA Key modulus, public exponent OR ecPublicKey { 1.2.840.10045.2.1}, namedCurve, { 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7} (NIST curve P-256)
Signature	Issuer CA's signature
<b>EXTENSIONS</b>	
authorityKeyIdentifier	Identifies the CA certificate that must be used to verify the Subscriber's certificate. Issuing CA SubjectkeyIndetifier
subjectKeyIdentifier	Octet String of unique value associated with the Public key
basicConstraints	CA=False
keyUsage	DigitalSignature, nonRepudiation(optional)
Extended Key Usage	Document Signing: {1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12}
certificatePolicies	The value must contain the OID representing the India PKI certificate policy the certificate is valid for .( Policy Identifier=2.16.356.100.2.4.1 or 2.16.356.100.2.4.2 )
cRLDistributionPoints	location of CRL information

## 7.2. CRL Profile

The CRL profiles are listed below.

### 7.2.1. Full and Complete CRL

A CA makes a full and complete CRL available to the OCSP Responders as specified below. This CRL is provided to the Relying Parties and published on the repository.

Field	Value
Version	V2 (1)
Issuer Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 11}
Issuer Distinguished Name	Per the requirements in [CCA-IOG]
thisUpdate	expressed in UTCTime until 2049
nextUpdate	expressed in UTCTime until 2049 (>= thisUpdate + CRL issuance frequency)
Revoked certificates list	0 or more 2-tuple of certificate serial number and revocation date (in Generalized Time)
Issuer's Signature	sha256 WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 11}
<b>CRL Extension</b>	<b>Value</b>

Field	Value
CRL Number	c=no; monotonically increasing integer (never repeated)
Authority Key Identifier	c=no; Octet String (same as in the Authority Key Identifier field in certificates issued by the CA)
CRL Entry Extension	Value
Reason Code	c=no; optional

### 7.2.2. Distribution Point-Based Partitioned CRL

CA issues only full and complete CRL signed by CA

### 7.3. OCSP Profile

OCSP requests and responses are by following RFC 2560 as listed below.

#### 7.3.1. OCSP Request Format

Requests sent to Issuer CA OCSP Responders are not required to be signed. The following table lists the fields that are expected by the OCSP Responder.

Field	Value
Version	V1 (0)
Requester Name	DN of the requestor (required)
Request List	List of certificates as specified in RFC 2560
Request Extension	Value
None	None
Request Entry Extension	Value
None	None

#### 7.3.2. OCSP Response Format

See RFC2560 for detailed syntax. The following table lists which fields are populated by the OCSP Responder.

<b>Field</b>	<b>Value</b>
Response Status	As specified in RFC 2560
Response Type	id-pkix-ocsp-basic {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1}
Version	V1 (0)
Responder ID	Octet String (same as subject key identifier in Responder certificate)
Produced At	Generalized Time
List of Responses	Each response will contain the certificate id; certificate status <sup>1</sup> , thisUpdate, nextUpdate <sup>2</sup> ,
Responder Signature	sha256 WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 11}
Certificates	Applicable certificates issued to the OCSP Responder
<b>Response Extension</b>	<b>Value</b>
Nonce	c=no; Value in the nonce field of request (required, if present in request)
<b>Response Extension</b>	<b>Entry</b>
None	None



## **8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments**

### **8.1. Frequency or Circumstances of Assessments**

Annual compliance audit by CCA empanelled Auditor is carried out of CAs infrastructure apart from half yearly internal audit

### **8.2. Identity and Qualifications of Assessor**

CCA empanels auditors based on their competence in the field of compliance audits, qualifications, and thorough familiarity with the requirements of the Act, CP, and CPS. The auditors perform such compliance audits as per the terms of empanelment and also under the guidance of CCA

### **8.3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity**

The auditor is independent of the entity being audited. The office of CCA determines whether an auditor meets this requirement.

### **8.4. Topics Covered by Assessment**

CA has a compliance audit mechanism in place to ensure that the requirements of this CPS are enforced.

### **8.5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency**

The office of CCA may determine that a CA is not complying with its obligations outlined in this CPS or the applicable CP. When such a determination is made, the office of CCA may suspend the operation of CA, may revoke the CA certificate, or may direct that other corrective actions be taken which allow the operation to continue.

When the auditor finds a discrepancy between how the CA is designed or is being operated or maintained, and the requirements of this CP, or the applicable CPS, the auditor take the following actions:

1. The auditor makes a note of the discrepancy;
2. The auditor notifies the audited CA; and
3. The auditor notifies the office of CCA.

### **8.6. Communication of Results**

On completion of the audit by an empanelled auditor, Auditor submits an Audit Report, including identification of corrective measures taken or being taken by CA, to the office of CCA and a copy to CA. The report identifies the version of the CPS used for the assessment.

## **9. Other Business and Legal Matters**

### **9.1. Fees**

#### **9.1.1. Certificate Issuance and Renewal Fees**

The fees for various types of certificates are made available on the CA website at <https://speedsignca.com> and will be updated from time to time.

#### **9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees**

CA is not charging any fees to Relying Parties or other public for accessing the certificate information from the repository. The certificate search facility is provided free of cost at its website <https://speedsignca.com>.

#### **9.1.3. Revocation Status Information Access Fees**

CA does not charge a fee for access to any revocation status information through CRL. CA may charge a fee for providing certificate status information via OCSP.

#### **9.1.4. Fees for Other Services**

No stipulation

#### **9.1.5. Refund Policy**

The refund policy and other payment terms are governed as per the terms in the SubscriberAgreement. In case the application is rejected the full amount would be refunded to the Subscriber.

## **9.2. Financial Responsibility**

### **9.2.1. Insurance Coverage**

CA maintains reasonable levels of insurance coverage to address all foreseeable liability obligations to PKI Participants described in Section 1.3 of this CPS

### **9.2.2. Other Assets**

CA also maintains reasonable and sufficient financial resources to maintain operations, fulfil duties, and address commercially reasonable liability obligations to PKI Participants described in Section 1.3 of this CPS.

### **9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities**

CA offers no protection to end entities that extends beyond the protections provided in this CPS

### **9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information**

CA maintains the confidentiality of confidential business information that is marked or labelled as confidential, or by its nature reasonably is understood to be confidential, and treats such information with the same degree of care and security as the CA treats its own most confidential information.

### **9.4. Privacy of Personal Information**

CA stores, processes, and discloses personally identifiable information by following the provisions of the IT Act 2000 & Rules made thereunder.

### **9.5. Intellectual Property Rights**

CA will not knowingly violate any intellectual property rights held by others.

#### **9.5.1. Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information**

CAs claim all Intellectual Property Rights in and to the Certificates and revocation information that they issue. However, permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates and revocation information on a nonexclusive royalty-free, worldwide basis, may be granted provided that the recipient agrees to distribute them at no cost.

#### **9.5.2. Property Rights in the CPS**

This CPS is based on the proforma CPS published by the Office of CCA for Licensed CAs and as amended from time to time. All Intellectual Property Rights in this CPS of CA are owned by the CA.

#### **9.5.3. Property Rights in Names**

CA may claim all rights, if any, in any trademark, service mark, or trade name of its services under the law for the time being in force.

#### **9.5.4. Property Rights in Keys**

CA may claim property rights to the keys used (e.g., CA key pair, OCSP Responder key pair, time stamp authority key pair, etc.) under the law for the time being in force

Subject to any agreements between CA and its customers, ownership of and property rights in key pairs corresponding to Certificates of Subscribers is specified in this CPS.

### **9.6. Representations and Warranties**

### **9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties**

#### **9.6.1.1. CA**

CA represents and warrants as per provisions of IT Act, 2000 & Rules made thereunder that;

1. signing private key is protected and no unauthorized person ever has access to that private key;
2. Each Subscriber has been required to represent and warrant that all information supplied by the Subscriber in connection with, and/or contained in the Certificate is true.
3. Only verified information appears on the certificate

#### **9.6.2. Subscriber**

A Subscriber is required to sign a document (e.g., a Subscriber agreement) containing the requirements the Subscriber to meet respecting the protection of the private key and use of the certificate before being issued the certificate.

In signing the document described above, each Subscriber should agree to the following:

1. The Subscriber is to accurately represent itself in all communications with the CA conducted.
2. The data contained in any certificates about the Subscriber is accurate.
3. The Subscriber should protect its private key at all times, as per this CPS, as stipulated in the certificate acceptance agreements, and local procedures
4. The Subscriber lawfully holds the private key corresponding to the public key identified in the Subscriber's certificate.
5. The Subscriber should abide by all the terms, conditions, and restrictions levied on the use of their private keys and certificates.
6. Subscribers are to promptly notify the appropriate CA upon suspicion of the loss or compromise of their private keys. Such notification is made directly or indirectly through mechanisms consistent with this CPS.
7. The Subscriber should follow the duties as mentioned in the IT Act.

#### **9.6.3. Relying Party**

Parties who rely upon the certificates issued under a policy defined in this document to :

1. Use the certificate for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in the certificate information (e.g., the key usage extension);
2. Check each certificate for validity, using procedures described in RFC 5280, before reliance;
3. Preserve original signed data, the applications necessary to read and process that data, and the cryptographic applications needed to verify the digital signatures on that data for as long as it may be necessary to verify the signature on that data. Note: data

format changes associated with application upgrades will often invalidate digital signatures and should be avoided.

#### **9.6.4. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

No stipulation.

#### **9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties**

To the extent permitted by applicable law and any other related agreements, CA disclaims all warranties other than any express warranties contained in such agreements or outlined in this CPS.

#### **9.8. Limitations of Liabilities**

CA limit liabilities as long as CA meet the liability requirements stated in the IT Act, 2000 and the Rules made thereunder. CA is responsible for verification of any Subscriber to whom it has issued a certificate and to all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on such certificate as per this CPS, for damages suffered by such persons that are caused by the failure of the CA to comply with the terms of its CPS or its Subscriber Agreement, and sustained by such persons as a result of the use of or reliance on the certificate.

The verification requirements for certificate issuance by CA are as specified under the IT Act 2000 and Rules made thereunder and reasonable effort by CA. CA cannot guarantee the activities or conduct of the Subscribers.

CA will not be liable for any indirect, exemplary, special, punitive, incidental, or consequential losses, damages, claims, liabilities, charges, costs, expenses, or injuries (including without limitation loss of use, data, revenue, profits, business and for any claims of Subscribers or Users or other third parties including Relying Parties).

CA will not be liable for any delay, default, failure, or breach of its obligations under the Subscribers Agreement, Relying Party Terms & Conditions, and Registration Authority Agreement.

All liability is limited to actual and legally provable damages. CA's liability is as per the IT Act 2000 and other governing Indian laws and Agreements. If the liability is not dealt with under the provisions of ITACT 2000, the following caps limit CA's damages concerning specific certificates.

<b>Class</b>	<b>Liability Caps/per Certificate</b>
Class 1	Indian Rupees Ten Thousand
Class 2	Indian Rupees One Lakh
Class 3	Indian Rupees One Lakh
eKYC - Single Factor	Indian Rupees -one thousand
eKYC - multi Factor	Indian Rupees -one thousand

## **9.9. Indemnities**

### **Indemnification by Subscribers**

To the extent permitted by applicable law, the Subscriber agreement requires Subscribers to indemnify CA for:

1. False and misrepresentation of fact by the Subscriber on the Subscriber's certificate application,
2. Suppression of a material fact on the certificate application, if the omission was made negligently or with intent to deceive any party,
3. The Subscriber's failure to protect the Subscriber's private key, to use a trustworthy system, or to otherwise take the precautions necessary to prevent the compromise, loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the Subscriber's private key, or
4. The Subscriber's use of a name (including without limitation within a common name, domain name, or e-mail address) infringes upon the Intellectual Property Rights of a third party.

### **Indemnification by Relying Parties**

To the extent permitted by applicable law, the relying party agreement requires the relying Parties to indemnify CA for:

1. The relying party's failure to perform the representations and warranties as outlined in section 9.6.3 of this CPS.
2. The relying party's reliance on a certificate that is not reasonable under the circumstances, or
3. The relying party's failure to check the status of such certificate to determine if the certificate is expired or revoked.

## **9.10. Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1. Term**

The CPS becomes effective upon approval by the Office of CCA. Amendments to this CPS become effective upon ratification by approval by CCA and publication by CA at <https://speedsignca.com>, There is no specified term for this CPS.

### **9.10.2. Termination**

While this CPS may be amended from time to time, it will remain in force until replaced by a newer version or explicitly terminated by CCA.

### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

Upon termination of this CPS, CA is nevertheless bound by its terms for all Certificates issued for the remainder of the validity periods of such Certificates. Sections 5.5 and 9.0 of this CPS will survive the termination or expiration of this CPS.

## **9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

Unless otherwise specified by agreement between the parties, CA uses commercially reasonable methods to communicate, taking into account the criticality and subject matter of the communication.

## **9.12. Amendments**

### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

CA will review this CPS at least once every year. Additional reviews may be enacted at any time at the discretion of the CCA.

If the Office of CCA wishes to recommend amendments or corrections to this CPS, such modifications will be submitted to CCA for approval.

CA will use reasonable efforts to notify Subscribers and Relying Parties of changes.

### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

Errors and anticipated changes to this CPS resulting from reviews are published online at <https://speedsignca.com>. This CPS and any subsequent changes are made publicly available within seven days of approval.

### **9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must be Changed**

CCA determines the requirement for changing the Certificate Policy OIDs.

## **9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions**

### **9.13.1. Disputes among Licensed CAs and Customers**

Unless the provision for dispute resolution under the IT Act is invoked, any dispute based on the contents of this CPS, between CA and one of its customers who has availed specific services will be resolved according to provisions in the applicable agreement between the parties.

Any dispute based on the contents of this CPS, between/among CAs, will be resolved by the CCA.

### **9.13.2. Alternate Dispute Resolution Provisions**

No stipulations.

#### **9.14. Governing Law**

The laws of India and more particularly the Information Technology Act, 2000, The Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000 and Information Technology (Certifying Authority) Regulations, 2001, and the guidelines issued and clarifications made from time to time by the Controller of Certifying Authorities, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology govern the construction, validity, enforceability, and performance of actions per this CPS.

#### **9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law**

This CPS is subject to applicable national, state, local and rules, regulations, ordinances, decrees, and orders including, but not limited to, restrictions on exporting or importing software, hardware, or technical information.

#### **9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions**

##### **9.16.1. Entire Agreement**

No stipulation.

##### **9.16.2. Assignment**

Except where specified by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate this CPS or any of its rights or duties under this CPS, without the prior written consent of CCA. Further, the Office of CCA at its discretion may assign and delegate this CPS to any party of its choice.

##### **9.16.3. Severability**

If any provision of this CPS is held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, then the remaining provisions will nevertheless remain in full force and effect.

##### **9.16.4. Waiver of Rights**

No waiver of any breach or default or any failure to exercise any right hereunder is construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach or default or relinquishment of any future right to exercise such right. The headings in this CPS are for convenience only and cannot be used in interpreting this CPS.

##### **9.16.5. Force Majeure**

CA is not liable for any failure or delays in its performance under this CPS due to causes that are beyond its reasonable control, including, but not limited to, an act of God, an act of civil or military authority, fire, epidemic, flood, earthquake, riot, war, and failure of equipment, failure of telecommunications lines, lack of Internet access, sabotage, and governmental action.



### **9.17. Other Provisions**

No stipulation.

## 10. Bibliography

The following documents were used in part to develop this CPS:

FIPS 140-2	Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, 1994-01 <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/">http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/</a>
FIPS 186-2	Digital Signature Standard, 2000-01-27 <a href="http://csrs.nist.gov/fips/fips186.pdf">http://csrs.nist.gov/fips/fips186.pdf</a>
ITACT 2000	The Information Technology Act, 2000, Government of India, June 9, 2000.
RFC 3647	Certificate Policy and Certificate Practices Framework, Chokhani, Ford, Sabett, Merrill, and Wu. November 2003.
CCA-IOG	Interoperability Guidelines for DSC, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-CP	X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-IVG	Identity Verification Guidelines, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-TSG	Time Stamping Services Guidelines for CAs, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-OCSP	OCSP Service Guidelines for CAs, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-SSL	Guidelines For Issuance Of SSL Certificates, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-OID	OID Hierarchy for India PKI(OID) <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">,http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CA-eAUTH	e-authentication guidelines, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-esignAPI	eSign API Specifications, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-CASITESP	CA SITE SPECIFICATION, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-CRYPTO	Security Requirements for Crypto Devices, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>
CCA-CALIC	CA Licensing Guidelines, <a href="http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html">http://www.cca.gov.in/cca/?q=guidelines.html</a>

## 11. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CA	Certifying Authority
CCA	Controller of Certifying Authorities
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSP	Certificate Status Provider
DN	Distinguished Name
DNS	Domain Name Service
FIPS	(US) Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB	(US) Federal Information Processing Standard Publication
HR	Human Resources
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IAO	Information Assurance Officer
ID	Identifier
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IT	Information Technology
OID	Object Identifier
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX	Public Key Infrastructure X.509
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request For Comments
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (encryption algorithm)
RCAI	Root Certifying Authority Of India
SHA-2	Secure Hash Algorithm, Version 1
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLS	Transport Layer Security
UPS	Uninterrupted Power Supply